OPTIMJACK Attack: How Hackers Turned Optimizely Into Malware on CNN, BBC and Zoom

On Monday, November 16, 2026, some of the most trusted websites on the internet started attacking their own visitors. People who opened CNN, the BBC, Zoom or Salesforce did nothing wrong — no suspicious link, no strange download. They simply visited a famous website, and it quietly served them malware.

The campaign is called the OPTIMJACK attack. Attackers poisoned Optimizely Web, a platform those sites share to test web page designs. By compromising one supplier, criminals turned 178 organisations’ websites into theft machines that swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card details, stole cookies and screenshots, and pushed iPhone and iPad users toward exploit kits. The attack ran about 17 hours. The money confirmed stolen is small, but the lesson is huge. Here is what happened and what to check now.

What Happened on November 16

The first poisoned script was spotted at 04:21 UTC on Monday, November 16, 2026, in the BBC’s Optimizely snippet. Security researcher Scott Helme, founder of the monitoring service Report URI, uncovered the campaign after checking 1,611 Optimizely scripts and finding malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations — likely an undercount, since his team could only check the scripts it could find.

Optimizely later confirmed to BleepingComputer that an attacker exploited a flaw in its Experimentation signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into some customers’ projects, via a field called Project JavaScript.

That is what made it so dangerous. Every affected site loads a small Optimizely script from cdn.optimizely.com, the company’s own content delivery network. Arriving from that trusted address, over a valid secure connection, inside a file identical to the normal snippet, the poisoned code was treated as legitimate. The websites were never broken into — they simply passed it to every visitor.

How the OPTIMJACK Attack Worked

A supply-chain attack strikes a supplier instead of the final target. Rather than breaking into 178 companies one by one, the criminals compromised one shared service and let trusted brand names do the delivery. Each Optimizely customer loads a JavaScript snippet that runs in every visitor’s browser to test page designs — so one flaw gave attackers a doorway into hundreds of websites at once, with no click or download needed.

The injected code loaded an extra payload from an attacker-controlled server, tracked as 1688360.cc/track.js — a roughly 30-kilobyte file rebuilt 26 times that day as the attackers added features and evaded detection. The domain was registered that morning.

Confirmed names include CNN, the BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger and IKEA. The malicious code itself was live for about 13 of the attack’s 17 hours.

Computer monitors showing green code in a dark room
Malicious code hid inside a trusted website script. Photo by Tima Miroshnichenko on Pexels.

What the Malware Did to Visitors

The OPTIMJACK attack was a bundle of theft tools, running silently in the browsers of people who had simply opened a news site or joined a video call.

Most damaging was the wallet-address clipper. When a visitor copied a cryptocurrency wallet address to send a payment, the malware silently replaced it with an attacker-controlled one, covering eight cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, TON, TRX, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. Crypto transactions cannot be reversed.

The code also included a payment card skimmer, and it stole browser cookies and screenshots. Stolen cookies can let an attacker log in to your accounts without your password.

Finally, the malware routed iPhone and iPad visitors into the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Coruna — disclosed by the Google Threat Intelligence Group and iVerify in March 2026 — is a framework of 23 exploits covering iOS 13.0 through 17.2.1. No iPhone compromise has been confirmed, but the attempt shows how ambitious the attackers were.

Who Was Affected

Anyone who visited one of the roughly 178 affected websites on November 16, 2026, while the poisoned scripts were live may have been exposed — readers of CNN, the BBC, Fox News and NPR, users of Zoom and Salesforce, and visitors to bank, airline, retailer and crypto sites.

But exposure is not harm. An infected script does not mean the site’s own servers were broken into, and the malware only did damage while the poisoned code was live. Risk was highest for people who copied a crypto wallet address, entered card details, or logged in on an affected page during the window. The recent ScreenConnect attack on managed service providers worked the same way.

How Much Money Was Stolen

Confirmed losses are modest, but researchers disagree on the figure. Independent researcher Amirul Cyber, who named the campaign OPTIMJACK, found the wallets in the payload had received roughly $7,040 in cryptocurrency by 19:25 UTC on November 16.

StepSecurity reported about $6,600 in activity tied to four linked wallets, but cautioned that some of it predated the attack. Galaxy Digital’s Alex Thorn put the confirmed stolen total lower, at around $2,300 across 19 transactions.

Only a few thousand dollars are confirmed stolen — but a single large transaction during the window could have changed that.

How It Was Found and Cleaned Up

Scott Helme of Report URI exposed the campaign in a post titled “World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely”. StepSecurity independently analysed the modified files and confirmed via urlscan.io records that the script loaded, or tried to load, on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN, Smartsheet and Salesforce.

A detailed reconstruction of the incident pulls together Report URI’s investigation, StepSecurity’s payload review, BleepingComputer’s reporting and Optimizely’s own statements.

Once Helme raised the alarm, cleanup was fast. A mass removal between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC on November 16 cut the infected scripts from 169 to one, and by 21:52 UTC only one file — belonging to UK broadband provider TalkTalk — still carried the code.

Optimizely posted on its status page at 01:02 UTC on November 17, and on X at 01:21 UTC, saying it had “identified and contained a security incident” and that “the vulnerable path is blocked, the injected code was removed, and customers have been contacted directly”. No threat actor has been publicly named.

Were You Affected? What to Do Now

If you visited CNN, the BBC, Zoom or any other major site on November 16, you were probably exposed to a poisoned script — but exposure alone does not mean you lost anything. Here is what visitors need to know.

Computer screen showing security protection software
Check accounts and update devices after the attack. Photo by Pixabay on Pexels.

Check crypto transactions. If you sent cryptocurrency on November 16, confirm the destination address in your wallet or exchange history matches the one you intended, character by character. If money went to an unfamiliar address, contact your exchange and law enforcement.

Check card statements. Look for unfamiliar charges from the last few days, and keep checking for weeks. If you entered card details anywhere on November 16, consider asking your bank for a replacement card.

Change passwords and sign out everywhere. If you logged in to any account on an affected site that day, change the password and use “sign out of all devices” before signing back in — stolen cookies can keep an attacker logged in even after a password change. Turn on two-factor authentication.

Update your devices. The attack tried to route Apple mobile users to exploit kits targeting older iOS versions, so update your iPhone or iPad now. Desktop users should install pending browser and system updates too.

Watch for follow-up scams. Criminals often send fake support messages to people they believe were exposed — read our guide on how to spot a phishing email first. A real company will never call out of the blue and ask for your wallet backup or recovery phrase.

Why OPTIMJACK Matters

The OPTIMJACK attack matters less for the money it stole than for what it proved. A website can be a household name, served over a secure connection, with no visible sign of trouble — and still serve malware, because the danger came through a supplier it trusted. Advice like “only visit reputable websites” would not have protected anyone here.

For website owners, the lesson is to audit third-party scripts and limit what they can do. For the rest of us, it is to treat every site as a potential risk, however famous: verify a wallet address on your hardware wallet’s screen before confirming a transfer, check statements regularly, and keep devices updated. The web runs on shared suppliers — and when one falls, the damage spreads everywhere at once.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was my computer infected if I visited CNN or the BBC on November 16?

Probably not. The code ran in your browser while the page was open and installed nothing — the risk was what it could steal during that visit: a copied wallet address, typed card details, or a session cookie.

Did the BBC or CNN get hacked?

No. Neither organisation’s servers were broken into — the code came from Optimizely, a third-party testing service both sites use.

Is it safe to visit those websites now?

Yes. By late on November 16, all but one of the 188 infected scripts had been cleaned, and Optimizely confirmed the vulnerable path was blocked.

The OPTIMJACK attack is over, but the pattern is not. Shared suppliers will be targeted again, and the next campaign may run longer and steal more. The best defence is not blind trust in big names, but small habits: verify before you send, check your statements, keep software updated, and never share a recovery phrase with anyone.

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